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SUBJECTIVITY IN ACADEMIC SALARY
DECISIONS: BROADENING THE SCOPE
OF DISPARATE IMPACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Salary disparities between male and female faculty members in
American colleges and universities is a historical problem1 currently
receiving closer attention.2 While ahead of American business in the
march toward equality,3 academia still suffers from marked disparities
in male and female faculty salaries.4 A major obstacle female faculty
1. See Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 754 F.2d 924 (11th Cir. 1985), where a
female faculty member, underpaid when she began in 1946, failed to receive a promo-
tion or salary increase from 1947 to 1971. Id at 925.
2. Approximately 220 colleges and universities have recently conducted salary eq-
uity studies, some at the direction of state legislatures. By spring 1987 approximately
100 schools had made salary adjustments for faculty members, clerical workers, or
both. The Chronicle of Higher Education, July 15, 1987, at 1, col. 3. Currently Wash-
ington University is seeking to remedy this salary problem. Id. at 1, col. 1.
3. According to the National Committee on Pay Equity, academic institutions actu-
ally have a smaller pay gap than American business as a whole. Id. at 1, col. 3. This
does not mean, however, that inequities do not exist.
4. The largest salary gap nationwide in academia is among full professors. Where
men earn an average salary of $46,070, women earn $40,630. Id at 14, col. 3. The
University of Missouri at Columbia faculty salary disparities are as follows:
Professor Average Salaries
Men $41,864
Women $38,168
Associate Professor
Men $31,891
Women $30,636
Assistant Professor
Men $29,406
Women $27,543
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members face in combatting salary disparities is evaluation programs'
incorporating subjective criteria. 6  Subjective evaluations based on
scholarship, quality of teaching, and number and quality of publica-
tions may have a discriminatory effect on women.7 Many aggrieved
female faculty members have invoked the Equal Pay Act8 to remedy
salary disparities. Title VII9 and its two major theories, disparate
treatment"° and disparate impact," have also proved useful in elimi-
nating salary disparities. 2 Nevertheless, the use of Title VII to remedy
Instructor
Men $23,066
Women $19,985
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 15, 1987, at 14D, 6ol. 2.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 93-96 (summary of factors used in academic
regression analysis).
6. 'Subjective criteria' include factors such as number and quality of publications,
faculty and student evaluations, quality of research, community service, and committee
work. See infra notes 63, 83, 91, 153 and accompanying text (enumerating subjective
factors used by universities in their salary determination process). For further discus-
sion of subjective employment practices, see Rose, Subjective Employment Practices:
Does the Discriminatory Impact Analysis Apply?, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 63 (1988);
Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 CHI.
[-]KENT L. REv. 1 (1987); Denis, Subjective Decision Making: Does it Have a Place in
the Employment Process?, 11 EMP. REL. L.J. 270 (1985); Lamber, Discretionary Deci-
sionmaking: The Application of Title VII's Disparate Impact Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L.
REv. 869.
7. Until recently, courts have failed to require subjective criteria as a factor in salary
discrimination cases. This apparent neglect, however, is completely unwarranted as
such criteria are often crucial to a college or university setting. See infra notes 167-73
and accompanying text (arguing for the mandatory inclusion of subjective factors in
multiple regression analysis).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982). See Schwartz v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901
(1lth Cir. 1987); Brock v. Georgia Southwestern College, 765 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1983)
(Equal Pay Act cases addressing university salary discrimination).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Congress' intent to include educational institutions
under Title VII's coverage is evidenced by the following House Report:
There is nothing in the legislative background of Title VII, nor does any national
policy suggest itself to support the exemption of these educational institution em-
ployees-primarily teachers--from Title VII coverage. Discrimination against wo-
men in the field of education is as pervasive as discrimination in any other area of
employment.
H. REp. No. 92-238, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2155.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 17-24 (discussing disparate treatment
theory).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 25-32 (discussing disparate impact theory).
12. Claims based on the Equal Pay Act are problematic because plaintiffs must
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academic salary discrimination is an ill-defined area of the law.1 3
While courts accept the disparate treatment theory in academic salary
discrimination claims, no court has determined whether disparate im-
pact is an acceptable method for contesting sex-based, subjective salary
decisions. 4 Given universities' concern with salary inequities, 5 chal-
lenges to an academic salary decision based on subjective criteria may
reach a federal court in the near future.
This Note examines the problem of salary disparities between male
and female faculty members in American colleges and universities.
Part II provides a brief explanation of multiple regression analysis, dis-
parate treatment, and disparate impact. Part III examines the develop-
ment of the pattern and practice and disparate treatment theories in
academic salary discrimination cases. Part IV explores the use of dis-
parate impact in nonacademic, subjective-criteria cases and its limited
use in academic cases. Part V recommends that courts include subjec-
tive criteria in multiple regression analysis, and that courts allow plain-
tiffs to use the disparate impact theory to contest academic salary
decisions based in part on subjective criteria.
II. THE USE OF DISPARATE TREATMENT AND DISPARATE
IMPACT TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination under
Title VII by showing disparate treatment or disparate impact. 16 The
Supreme Court established the disparate treatment theory in McDon-
nell Douglas v. Green, 7 which involved an employer's discharge of a
prove the male and female jobs compared are in fact substantially equivalent. Compar-
ing jobs in a college or university setting can be particularly troublesome because teach-
ing jobs vary widely among departments and disciplines. See infra notes 66-72 and
accompanying text; see Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984) (comparing nursing faculty with professors from
other schools within the University).
13. See infra notes 174-84 and accompanying text (arguing for use of disparate im-
pact to combat partially subjective academic salary decisions).
14. See infra notes 117-39 and accompanying text (discussing Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988), which dealt with subjective factors in a
racial discrimination context).
15. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (current academic concern over salary
inequities).
16. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 n.5 (1981);
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (contrasting disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact).
17. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
1989)
Washington University Open Scholarship
88 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 36:85
black employee who had participated in illegal civil rights protests
against the employer.1 8 The Court held that an employee establishes a
prima facie case of race discrimination by proving that: "(i) he belongs
to a racial minority; (ii) he applied and was qualified for a job which
the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; (iv) after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications." 9 Once the plaintiff establishes this four-part test, the
employer must produce evidence showing a "legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the employee's rejection."2
While useful as a theory to individual plaintiffs, the McDonnell
Douglas test becomes burdensome in class actions involving many
claimants. Thus, plaintiffs employ the pattern and practice theory to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination in class actions. 21 In a
pattern and practice suit, the plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that discrimination is the defendant's regular operating
procedure.22 In proving such facts, plaintiffs need not establish that
each member of the class was a victim of the employer's practice.2"
Rather, plaintiffs may use statistics to imply broad-based, widespread
discrimination, much like cases using disparate impact.24
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,25 the Supreme Court established guide-
lines for the construction of a prima facie case under the disparate im-
pact theory.26 The Court later refined these guidelines in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody.27 Under disparate impact theory, the court must
determine, based mainly on the statistics offered by the plaintiff and
18. Id. at 794.
19. Id. at 802.
20. Id
21. For a discussion of the pattern and practice theory in class actions, see B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1322-24 (2d ed. 1983).
22. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
23. Id. at 360. The Court stated that the Government must prove the existence of
the employer's discriminatory policy. Id.
24. See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (addressing the use of statistics to
prove discrimination).
25. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
26. Before the enactment of Title VII, lower federal courts used a disparate impact-
like analysis to find evidence of discrimination. See Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight,
Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1971) (barring transfer of city truck drivers to over-the-
road jobs).
27. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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defendant,28 whether a facially neutral employment device or practice
adversely impacts upon a protected group.29 In disparate impact cases,
a plaintiff need not prove employer intent.3° Instead, disparate impact
analysis examines the consequences of the employment practice, not its
motivation.3 An employment practice that produces an adverse im-
pact is deemed illegal if it is not related to job performance. 32 The
disparate impact theory is difficult to apply in a university setting be-
cause courts must decide whether subjective criteria are "facially
neutral."
III. THE APPLICATION OF DISPARATE TREATMENT ANALYSIS TO
ACADEMIC SALARY DISCRIMINATION
A. The Use of Multiple Regression Analysis to Prove Discrimination
Multiple regression analysis seeks to organize and explain seemingly
random data in order to prove classwide salary discrimination.3 3 In
multiple regression analysis, variables such as years of experience, de-
gree, discipline, and faculty rank are held constant to determine
whether disparities exist in the treatment of male and female faculty
members.3 4 Statistics concerning the atmosphere of discrimination,
while not completely probative, often serve to prove an employer's dis-
crimination against the plaintiff.35
Recently, the Supreme Court considered whether a multiple regres-
sion analysis must include all determinative variables before admission
28. Parties may also use anecdotal evidence to bolster their claims of discrimina-
tion. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 338.
29. Id. at 335 n.15.
30. Id.
31. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). The Court stated that
good intent alone will not save a discriminatory employment practice. Id.
32. Id. at 431.
33. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 403 n.14 (1986) (per curiam) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part). For an explanation of the mathematical processes used in a multi-
ple regression analysis, see generally Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple
Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 737
(1980); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 702
(1980).
34. The Chronicle of Higher Education, supra note 2, at 14, col. 3.
35. Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 685 F.2d 743, 749-50 (1st Cir. 1982). In Lamphere,
the plaintiffs' argument failed because it omitted statistics on the number of qualified
women in the labor pool and impermissibly compared interdepartmental salaries. Id. at
750.
1989]
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into evidence. In Bazemore v. Friday,6 the Court held that a regres-
sion analysis need not include all measurable variables in order to es-
tablish a case of discrimination.37 In overruling the Fourth Circuit,38
the Supreme Court maintained that absence of measurable factors may
only affect the probativeness of the study, not its admissibility.39 The
Court also stated that defendants in such cases must attempt to show
that, when all factors are properly considered, no significant disparity
exists between the two groups in question.' Though Bazemore was a
race discrimination case, its broad holding should apply to claims al-
leging sex discrimination in academic salary determinations that use
subjective criteria. 1
B. Challenges to Academic Salary Discrimination
Using Disparate Treatment
Mecklenburg v. Montana State University42 marked the first success-
ful class action brought by female faculty members. In Mecklenburg, a
class of more than 105 female faculty members43 complained that
MSU had discriminated on the basis of sex in salary,44 promotion, and
36. 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam). In Bazemore, black employees of the North
Carolina Agricultural Extension Service sued the Service, claiming a pattern and prac-
tice of race discrimination based on salary disparities between white and black employ-
ees. Designed to disseminate information concerning agricultural and home economics,
the Service had a long history of racial segregation. Id. at 391 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that plaintiffs'
multiple regression analysis, which used factors such as race, education, tenure, and job
title, would not support a finding of salary discrimination. Id. at 394.
37. Id at 387.
38. 751 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1984).
39. 478 U.S. at 400 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Fourth Circuit objected to the
exclusion of a variable which would account for differences in salary increases among
counties. Id.
40. Id at 403 n.14.
41. Plaintiffs in sex-based, academic salary discrimination cases might use Bazemore
to argue that a court must consider subjective criteria. While a court may find a study
excluding subjective factors admissible, it might question the probative value of the
study, especially in the academic setting, where subjective factors are weighed heavily.
See infra notes 167-73 and accompanying text (arguing for mandatory inclusion of sub-
jective criteria in multiple regression analysis).
42. 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCII) % 11,438 (D. Mont. 1976).
43. Mecklenburg, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 6493. The class included both current and
former MSU employees as well as some applicants. Id.
44. Plaintiffs charged the University with "unequal pay for equal education and
equal work .. " Id. at 6494.
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tenure.45 MSU determined salary in a predominantly secretive man-
ner that gave faculty members little opportunity to appeal successfully
a decision.46 Attempting to prove a pattern and practice of salary dis-
crimination, plaintiffs hired a statistical expert to conduct a multiple
regression analysis.47 Using factors such as department, years of expe-
rience, and type of degree held, the expert concluded that it would take
$222,776 to equalize faculty salaries for 1974-75. 4" Importantly, the
expert omitted factors such as professorial rank, tenure, and number of
promotions,49 which he considered sex-dependent, or incapable of indi-
cating the existence of sexually discriminatory policies in the Univer-
sity's program. 50
Finally, both plaintiffs' and defendant's statistical experts excluded
subjective variables such as teaching ability, research contributions,
and community contributions.5 1 The defendants argued that the court
should not question such factors, given their uniqueness to the aca-
demic setting.5 2 Accepting the validity of this assertion, 53 the court did
not require the inclusion of rank or subjective factors in the multiple
regression analysis.
5 4
One year later, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
45. Id. at 6495.
46. At this time the department head had almost complete control over salary deci-
sions. Each faculty member received a letter with a predetermined salary amount but no
stated justification for the given sum. The only opportunity for a pre-or post-salary
hearing was if the faculty member made an appointment with the department head or
approving dean. Few faculty members took advantage of the opportunity to appeal. G.
LANOUE & B. LEE, ACADEMICS IN COURT: THE CONSEQUENCES OF FACULTY Dis-
CRIMINATION 148 (1987).
47. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (explaining multiple regression
analysis).
48. Mecklenburg, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 6496.
49. Id.
50. Id. Plaintiffs' statistical expert, Dr. Steven Gilchrest, characterized rank as an
unsatisfactory indicator of discrimination because intra-rank salary comparisons would
not reveal any sexually discriminatory program policies. Id. The court found that the
University's statistical study did not refute Gilchrest's findings. Id.
51. Id. Although the court gave no reason for this omission, both experts probably
avoided these variables due to their lack of measurability.
52. G. LANOUE & B. LEE, supra note 46, at 164.
53. See In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Dinnan v.
Blaubergs, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982) (expressly rejecting the academic peer review privilege
in tenure decisions).
54. Mecklenburg, 13 EmpI. Prac. Dec. at 6496. One must imply this from the
court's refusal to dismiss either regression analysis for lack of proper factors.
1989]
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trict of Pennsylvania indirectly questioned parts of the Mecklenburg
opinion in Presseisen v. Swarthmore College." Like Mecklenburg, Pres-
seisen involved a faculty class action charging sex discrimination in hir-
ing, promotion, tenure decisions, and compensation. 6 The Presseisen
court, however, diverged from the Mecklenburg court in its determina-
tion of the proper factors to employ in a regression analysis.5 7
Although the defendant's analysis included variables such as sex, age,
number of years since highest degree attained, years at Swarthmore,
degree, and division," the College failed to incorporate rank5 9 or sub-
jective factors." Unlike Mecklenburg, the Presseisen court found the
exclusion of rank unjustifiable and, after holding rank constant, ruled
that the plaintiffs' prima facie case had failed.61 Also in contrast to
Mecklenburg,62  the court found subjective variables 63  significant
enough to warrant their inclusion" in the regression analysis and en-
55. 422 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978).
56. The court defined the class as:
all present female employees at Swarthmore College, all future female faculty em-
ployees at Swarthmore College, all former female faculty employees who left the
employ of Swarthmore College on or subsequent to March 24, 1972, and those
applicants for faculty positions who applied to Swarthmore College and were re-
jected on or subsequent to March 24, 1972, who have been, are at present being or
in the future may be:
(1) denied hire, promotion and/or tenure at Swarthmore College or were not re-
cruited by Swarthmore College on account of their sex; and/or
(2) denied equal compensation for performance of substantially similar work as is
performed by male faculty members at Swarthmore College, on account of
their sex.
442 F. Supp. at 597.
57. See supra text accompanying note 48 for a list of Mecklenburg factors.
58. 442 F. Supp. at 615.
59. Id. at 614-15. Dr. deCani, the defendant's statistician, suggested excluding rank
because it failed to demonstrate that women generally took longer to reach a given
professorial status. Id at 614.
60. Id. at 616.
61. Id. at 614. The court further stated that the plaintiffs' prima facie case would
have failed even if the defendants had properly excluded rank. Id.
62. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (Mecklenburg court did not require
subjective factors in regression analysis).
63. These factors included "scholarship, teaching ability, publications, quality of
degree, career interruptions, career opportunity, quality of publications, administrative
responsibility and committee work." Presseisen, 442 F. Supp. at 616.
64. Id. All parties conceded that many of these subjective factors defied accurate
measurability. Id.
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couraged their utilization.65
In Wilkins v. University of Houston,66 the plaintiffs used a four-factor
multiple regression analysis67 to show disparities in male and female
faculty salaries.68 The Fifth Circuit, however, found the plaintiffs' re-
gression analysis fatally flawed because it excluded the professor's aca-
demic department.69 The court reasoned that, all other factors being
equal, market demand may dictate that universities pay professors in
some colleges more than those in others.70 Additionally, the court held
that plaintiffs' failure to consider the professor's college simultaneously
with other factors negated any possible inference that sex was the main
reason for faculty salary disparities.71 Thus, the Wilkins court added
market demand as another acceptable factor in multiple regression
analysis.7 2
In Melani v. Board of Higher Education of New York, 73 female in-
structors74 brought a Title VII suit alleging a pattern and practice of
discrimination in hiring, promotion, salary, and fringe benefits. 75 Us-
65. Id.
66. 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. Unit A), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 459
U.S. 809 (1982), aff'd on remand, 695 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1983).
67. These factors included rank, college, length of service, and age. Wilkins, 654
F.2d at 402. The University performed two multiple regression analyses, the first of
which included the following eight factors: (1) the mean salary of the department; (2)
experience as an instructor at any university, including the University of Houston; (3)
experience as a faculty member other than at the University of Houston; (4) experience
as a full professor at the University of Houston; (5) experience as an associate professor
at the University of Houston; (6) experience as an assistant professor at the University
of Houston; (7) possession of a doctoral degree other than a Ph.D.; (8) possession of a
Ph.D. degree. Id. at 403. The second analysis added 'sex' as a ninth variable. Id.
68. The plaintiffs' regression analysis showed a $1,388 per year disparity between
male and female faculty salaries. Id. at 403. The defendants claimed that no pay dispar-
ity existed, even after the second regression analysis revealed a $694 gap. Id.
69. Id. at 402.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. More recent decisions have cited Wilkins for the proposition that litigants must
include all significant factors influencing the dependent variable in order to make a
regression analysis viable. See E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264,
1287 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
73. 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
74. "Instructional staff" included positions such as professor, associate professor,
lecturer, and instructor, as well as administrative and service positions such as registrar,
college laboratory technician, and higher education officer. Id. at 772.
75. Id. at 773. Plaintiffs alleged that generally the Board paid higher wages to males
than to similarly qualified females. Id
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ing two different regression studies,7" plaintiffs claimed their evidence
proved male/female salary differentials of nearly $3,530 for all faculty
members77 and $1,600 for those hired after 1972.78 In evaluating the
regression analyses, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York first excluded job title as a necessary factor if
employees held similar jobs.7 9 Second, the court stated that the Board
had failed to rebut plaintiffs' statistics because it had shown only intra-
rather than inter-rank salary disparities.80 By failing to compare be-
tween rank, the court believed the defendants had hidden their assign-
ment of women to undeservedly lower ranks, which would provide
another example of salary discrimination.81 Third, the court allowed
the plaintiffs' regression analyses to stand even though plaintiffs had
failed to include the market demand variable, which may have helped
explain the salary differential.8 2 Most importantly, the Melani court
did not require the incorporation of subjective factors in the plaintiffs'
multiple regression analysis.83 Recognizing that a woman might have
more demanding teaching responsibilities which could adversely affect
the quality of her teaching and publications, the court declined to re-
quire the inclusion of subjective factors.84
Finally, in Craik v. Minnesota State University Board,"5 the Eighth
Circuit found St. Cloud State University guilty of unlawful discrimina-
76. Study I, covering all fuiltime, active instructional staff members, used the fol-
lowing 'productivity factors': highest degree, age, years of CUNY service, and years
since highest degree. Id. at 773. Study II, including all employees hired after Septem-
ber 1972, used age, years of CUNY service, academic degrees, quality of degree, certifi-
cates and credentials, time since last degree, and time between completion of successive
degrees. Id. at 774.
77. Id at 773.
78. Melani, 561 F. Supp. at 774.
79. Id. at 777. The court cited Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56,
70-71 (D.C. Cir. 1982), for this proposition. Id.
80. Melani, 561 F. Supp. at 783.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 779. But see Freed & Polsby, Comparable Worth in the Equal Pay Act, 51
U. CHI. L. REv. 1078, 1109-10 (1984) (challenging the wisdom of this decision due to
the nonfungibility of faculty in different disciplines).
83. Melani, 561 F. Supp. at 778. These factors, according to the Board, included
"publications, total years of teaching experience, quality of teaching, committee work
and community service." Id.
84. Id. See Freed & Polsby, supra note 82, at 1107 (arguing that the court did not
presume these productivity variables tainted).
85. 731 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984).
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tion in both rank and salary.8 6 After holding constant such factors as
experience, degree, division, and rank, the court concluded that proof
of intentional salary discrimination existed."7 Additionally, the Craik
court excluded 'division' as a variable because it had no bearing in the
University's salary determinations.8 8 The court did allow market de-
mand factor89 and performance factor9° increases, which it concluded
did not adversely affect women.9 1 Thus, the Craik court included sub-
jective factors through its allowance of market and performance
factors.
Courts generally agree that rank,92 degree, years spent in the univer-
sity, and time since last degree are acceptable regression analysis vari-
ables.9 3 'Division' and 'college' are also included if they are regularly
used in university salary determinations.94 Courts have yet to deter-
mine, however, whether subjective factors are mandatory in an aca-
demic multiple regression analysis.95 While Presseisen, Wilkins, and
Craik urge the inclusion of subjective criteria,96 Mecklenberg and Me-
lani allowed plaintiffs to proceed without using subjective variables.9 7
86. Id. at 478-79.
87. Id. at 479.
88. Id. The court concluded that the Board simply invented this variable in an
attempt to explain away interdepartmental salary disparities. Id.
89. Id. at 480. The Board granted these awards in areas in which a numerical defi-
ciency of professors existed, namely in business administration, computer science, eco-
nomics, engineering technology, and mathematics. Id
90. Id. "Performance increases" were merit based, but the opinion fails to mention
the method of determining these awards. Id.
91. Id. Of the eighteen market factor recipients, only one, or six percent of that
group, was a woman. Id. Only a three percent disparity existed between female and
male employees receiving performance factor increases. Id
92. See infra note 155 and accompanying text (court in Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 566
F. Supp. 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), required the inclusion of rank as a factor in statistical
studies attempting to prove academic, sex-based salary discrimination).
93. See supra notes 48, 58, 67, 76, 87 and accompanying text (regression analysis
factors considered in five previously discussed cases).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 71, 88 (Wilkins and Craik courts' opinion
regarding the inclusion of 'division' as a factor in regression analysis).
95. See supra note 6 (defining "subjective criteria").
96. See supra notes 62-65, 69-72, 89-91 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 54, 84 and accompanying text.
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IV. DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
A. Subjective Employment Practices
Plaintiffs initially used the disparate impact theory to attack employ-
ment practices* based on objective criteria such as general intelligence
tests9" or height and weight requirements.99 More recently, however,
plaintiffs have adopted this theory to challenge employer decisions
based on subjective practices"° such as an interviewer's assessment of
the candidate's size or strength, 101 or an interviewer's own ranking of a
list of desired employment qualities. 102 Regardless of whether the em-
ployer uses the subjective method, courts since Griggs' 03 have scruti-
nized practices which might operate as "built-in-headwinds" against a
protected group.1°4 In the last decade federal circuit courts have split
on whether plaintiffs may use the disparate impact theory to challenge
employment practices based on subjective criteria. While the Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have allowed such ac-
tions, 05 the Fourth Circuit has denied any such efforts.' 6 The Fifth,
Eighth and Tenth Circuits currently show internal dissension. 107
98. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 433 U.S. 424 (1971); Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
99. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 324 (1977).
100. See Comment, Disparate Impact and Subjective Employment Criteria Under
Title VII, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 957, 962 (1987) (most subjectivity arises from supervisor
or interviewer preferences).
101. See E.E.O.C. v. Spokane Concrete Prods., 534 F. Supp. 518, 523 (E.D. Wash.
1982) (company agent hired male applicant because he 'appeared to be' strong).
102. See Hung Ping Wang v. Hoffman, 694 F.2d 1146, 1147 (9th Cir. 1982) (promo-
tion system allowed project supervisors to determine hiring criteria on an ad hoc basis).
103. 433 U.S. 424 (1971). See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text (discussing
Griggs and the development of disparate impact theory).
104. Id. at 432.
105. The following cases allowed the use of disparate impact to challenge subjec-
tive-based employment practices: Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., Numerical Con-
trol, 690 F.2d 88, 92 (6th Cir. 1982); Regner v. City of Chicago, 789 F.2d 534, 537 (7th
Cir. 1986); Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 1976);
Antonio v. Ward's Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1478, 1480, 1489 n.2 (9th Cir.
1987) (listing cases); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1523-25 (11th Cir. 1985); Maddox
v. Claytor, 764 F.2d 1539, 1548 (1lth Cir. 1985); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1266
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
106. E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 639 (4th Cir.
1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
467 U.S. 867 (1984).
107. Compare Page v. United States Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 1038, 1045-46 (5th Cir.
1984); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 221 (5th Cir. 1974);
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The Eighth Circuit's decisions in E.E.O.C. v. Rath Packing Co.108
and Talley v. United States Postal Service o exemplify that court's in-
ternal dissension. In Rath, female plaintiffs challenged a plant man-
ager's employment selection system that lacked specified guidelines
and stressed little, if any, objective selection criteria." 0 Faced with an
enormous statistical disparity between the number of male and female
plant employees, 1 the court held that the defendant's subjective sys-
tem had an illegal disparate impact on women and was not justified by
business necessity. 1 2 Four years earlier, however, the Talley" 3 court
barred an employee's use of disparate impact where the employer dis-
charged her based on subjective reasons." 4 Because the plaintiff had
cited a subjective decision rather than a facially neutral employment
practice, the court held that her disparate impact claim must fail." 5
Thus, neither the Eighth Circuit nor the federal circuit courts as a
whole".6 have conclusively determined whether a plaintiff may use the
disparate impact theory to contest subjective employment practices.
The United States Supreme Court recently clarified this area in Wat-
Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 355 (5th Cir. 1972) (permitting suit) with
Vuyanich v. Republican Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 723 F.2d 1195, 1202 (5th Cir. 1984);
Cunningham v. Housing Auth. of City of Opelousas, 764 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1985)
(barring suit).
Compare E.E.O.C. v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 328 (8th Cir. 1986) (permit-
ting suit) with Talley v. United States Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505, 507 (8th Cir. 1983)
(barring suit).
Compare Lasso v. Woodmen of World Life Ins. Co., 741 F.2d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir.
1984); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 348 (10th Cir. 1975) (permitting
suit) with Mortenson v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822, 824 (10th Cir. 1982) (barring suit).
The Second Circuit has not addressed the question directly on point.
108. 787 F.2d 318, 328 (8th Cir. 1986) (permitting suit).
109. 720 F.2d 505, 507 (8th Cir. 1983) (disallowing suit).
110. Rath, 787 F.2d at 322.
11. Id. at 328. Males comprised 95% of all plant employees. Id.
112. Id. Under disparate impact analysis, an employer may justify his employment
practice by claiming that it is essential to his business. See generally B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 21, at 358-60 (discussing the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion and business necessity defenses).
113. 720 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1983).
114. Talley, 720 F.2d at 506. Normal Talley's postal supervisor discharged her af-
ter she had twice lost the keys to her mail carrier vehicle. The supervisor believed that
such actions constituted "a serious threat to the security of the mall that necessitated
her discharge." Id.
115. Id. at 507.
116. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (circuit court decisions address-
ing use of disparate impact to contest subjective decisions).
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son v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust.1 17 In Watson, a black female bank
employee, denied promotions on four separate occasions, brought a
class action on behalf of past, present, and future black bank employ-
ees.11 The class action charged the Bank with race discrimination in
hiring, promotion, salary, initial placement, and termination in viola-
tion of Title VII and section 1981.119 Both Watson and the class
claimed the bank's largely subjective decision-making system, 120 domi-
nated by one person's decisions and opinions, created an adverse im-
pact on blacks. 121
Finding Watson an inadequate representative of the class,122 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas decerti-
fled the class12 3 and, utilizing disparate treatment analysis, held that
Watson herself had not suffered from racial discrimination.1 24 The
117. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988). For a brief discussion of Watson see Title VII -Dispa-
rate Impact Challenges to Subjective Employment Decisions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 308
(1988).
118. The district court certified a class consisting of "blacks who applied to or were
employed by [respondent] on or after October 21, 1979 or later submit employment
applications to [respondent] in the future." 108 S. Ct. at 2782.
119. Id.
120. Id Under the bank's system, which had few definite guidelines, supervisors
made virtually all decisions in their respective department. Id.
121. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 804 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting). The adverse impact is illustrated by the following statistics:
Offers of Employment by Race
Whites Blacks
Offer 16.7% (89) 4.2% (6)
No Offer 83.3% (444) 95.8% (60)
Offers to Teller Applicants by Race
Offer 20.1% (32) 5.3% (6)
No Offer 79.9% (127) 94.7% (54)
Offers to Clerical Applicants by Race
Offer 15.2% (30) 4.8% (3)
No Offer 84.8% (168) 95.2% (60)
Id.
122. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2783. The district court deemed Watson's claims atypi-
cal of the general class claims. Id.
123. The district court later decertified the class for lack of common factual or legal
questions between applicants and employees. The court then decertified the employee
subclass for insufficient number, but addressed the merits the applicants' claims. Id. at
2782-83.
124. Id at 2783. The court, utilizing disparate treatment analysis, held that while
Watson had established a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the defendant
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Fifth Circuit affirmed in part,'2 5 holding that courts should employ
disparate treatment, not disparate impact, to evaluate subjective pro-
motion systems. 12 The United States Supreme Court reversed. Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority,127 noted that subjective employ-
ment practices and objective or standard examinations may have the
same discriminatory effects.128 Thus, because both subjective and ob-
jective systems result in impermissible discrimination, the Court rea-
soned that an examination of employer intent was inappropriate.'29
Consequently, the Court held that disparate impact is also an appropri-
ate method to challenge subjective employment practices.'l 0
Next, the Court focused on the necessary evidentiary standards in
disparate impact cases.' 3 ' Acknowledging the bank's concern that
many subjective criteria are nonmeasurable,13 2 the Court expressly
stated that it did not intend its holding to compel employers to adopt
preferential treatment or quotas to avoid litigation.' 3 The Court enu-
merated several constraints inherent in subjective employment practice
cases that would prevent this result. First, the plaintiff must "isolate
and identify" the specific employment practice causing the alleged dis-
parity. 134 Next, the plaintiff must prove, through statistical evidence,
had successfully rebutted her challenges. Finding no pretext for racial discrimination,
the court dismissed the action. Id.
125. Id. The Fifth Circuit found no district court abuse of discretion in its class
decertification. Seeking to avoid unfair prejudice to the class of black job applicants, the
court vacated that segment of the district court ruling and remanded for dismissal with-
out prejudice. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision regarding Wat-
son's failure to prove discrimination. Id.
126. Id. The majority utilized the disparate treatment theory primarily because af-
ter class decertification no large group existed upon which such subjective decisions
could impact. Watson, 798 F.2d at 797.
127. 108 S. Ct. at 2782. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun all joined in endorsing application of disparate impact analysis to
subjective employment systems. Id. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision.
128. Id. at 2786.
129. Id. at 2787.
130. Id. at 2791.
131. Id. at 2787-91. The Court expressed the greatest concern over this segment of
the case. Id. at 2787.
132. The Court stated, "Some qualities-for example, common sense, good judg-
ment, originality, ambition, loyalty, and taste--cannot be measured accurately through
standardized testing techniques." Id. at 2787.
133. Id at 2788. Such a result, the Court concluded, would violate Congress' in-
tent in enacting Title VII. Id at 2787-88.
134. Id at 2788. The Court conceded that it is more difficult to identify specific
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that the subjective practice caused the exclusion of applicants because
of their membership in a protected group. 135 Third, the Court noted
that under disparate impact analysis, the ultimate burden of proof re-
mains with the plaintiff.136 Thus, when the employer proves a legiti-
mate business reason for the challenged practice, the plaintiff must
show that other selection methods would equally serve the employer's
legitimate interests.' 37 Finally, the Court noted the deferential judicial
attitude toward employer selection procedures.13 Thus, the Court be-
lieved that these high standards of proof would prevent employers'
drastic modification of their normal, legitimate practices. 139
B. Sex-Based Academic Salary Discrimination
Faculty members initially used disparate impact analysis to chal-
lenge denials of tenure."4 In 1981, however, the Ninth Circuit became
the first federal court to hear a case invoking disparate impact to con-
test an academic salary system. In Heagney v. Washington,'4' the
plaintiff claimed the University's exemption of a class of faculty mem-
bers from normal school personnel laws adversely affected the salaries
of nonexempt female personnel. 142 Such a classification, the plaintiff
claimed, granted the administration too much discretion and enabled it
discriminatory practices when employers use subjective criteria rather than standard-
ized tests. Id.
135. IdL at 2788-89. Plaintiffs must at least raise an inference of causation. Id. at
2789. The Court also warned future defendants and courts not to assume the reliability
of plaintiff's statistical evidence. Id.
136. Id at 2790. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text (disparate impact
analysis).
137. Id. at 2790 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
138. 108 S. Ct. at 2790-91. The Court used prior cases such as Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978), and Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85,
96 (2d Cir. 1984), to show courts' traditionally deferential attitudes toward the legiti-
macy and relatedness of employer selection procedures. 108 S. Ct. at 2791.
139. Id.
140. See Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857 (D. Vt. 1976); Zahorik v.
Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 96 (2d Cir. 1984) (both courts rejected the application of
disparate impact to the denial of tenure).
141. 642 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981).
142. Id. at 1159. The University categorized nonacademic personnel as either 'clas-
sified' or 'exempt.' State salary schedules set the salaries of classified employees. The
University had much more discretion to exempt salary awards. Heagney's claim alleged
that as a group, female exempt employees received lower salaries than men in the same
category. Id.
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to compensate employees with few or no guidelines.14 3 The court held
that the invention of such an employee class did not constitute a "well-
defined objective employment practice." 1" Because of this lack of ob-
jectivity, the court found the use of disparate impact inappropriate.1 45
In Sobel v. Yeshiva University 46 a class of female physicians, invok-
ing disparate treatment and disparate impact, claimed their university
employer had discriminated against them in salary and pension.
Yeshiva varied faculty salaries according to the faculty member's
placement in a clinical, research, or teaching capacity. 47 Two
problems existed in the plaintiffs' case from its inception: the lack of
interchangeability in faculty positions 148 and the tendency of women
professors to specialize in lower paying nonclinical fields.149 Yeshiva's
system of 'guideline increases,' which gave faculty members either a
percentage salary increase, a fixed increase, or a combination of the
two, also complicated the plaintiffs' attempts to prove salary inequi-
ties."50 Finally, the system allowed the department head to recom-
mend nonguideline increases above or below the established rate."'
The Dean treated the latter increases with considerably more
scrutiny.15
2
Disputes arose concerning the inclusion of two variables in the re-
143. Id
144. Id. at 1163. The court also stated that the use of objective criteria in salary
decisions was not per se unlawful. Id.
145. Id. The court believed that Heagney had alleged a pattern and practice of
discrimination, thus making disparate treatment a more appropriate theory. Id.
146. 566 F. Supp. 1166, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
147. Id. at 1170. Faculty salaries varied with the amount of money the position
brought to the University. Generally, doctors engaged in clinical activities received the
highest compensation, followed by those in research. Doctors engaged in classroom
work received the lowest income. Id.
148. Id. at 1171.
149. Id. The court found no evidence indicating that any of the female faculty had
faced any coercion in making their respective choices. Id. at 1171 n.16.
150. Id. at 1172. These guideline increases, computed annually, were based on cost-
of-living increases and the current financial stability of the University. Id. The Univer-
sity did allow mid-year increases under special circumstances, such as where a faculty
member became burdened with a great increase in duties and responsibilities. Id. at
1172 n.20.
151. Id at 1172. The University allowed above-guideline increases where a faculty
member showed marked achievement or an increase in production. Below-guideline
increases often resulted from either financial difficulties in a given department or a
faculty member's relinquishment of previously held duties. Id.
152. Id
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gression analysis - rank and post-hire productivity."' Relying on
Presseisen v. Swarthmore College,'54 the court held that the exclusion
of rank as a variable made the statistical study incomplete.15 The
court further held that a regression analysis must include post-hire pro-
ductivity factors since most universities consider productivity in salary
determinations.1 56
In addition to ruling in favor of the University on the pattern and
practice claim,' 5 7 the court rejected the plaintiffs' disparate impact
claim on two separate grounds.'58 First, the court found the plaintiffs'
mid-trial change from disparate treatment to disparate impact proce-
durally unfair.'5 9 More importantly, plaintiff's disparate impact claim
failed on the merits because the evidence indicated that Yeshiva's
guideline increase system, neutral in principal and operation, had ade-
quately remedied any past salary disparities.
In Spaulding v. University of Washington,' 61 former and current fe-
male faculty members of the School of Nursing brought an action
claiming that the disparity between their salaries and those in other
schools within the University constituted sex discrimination in viola-
153. In the instant case, post-hire productivity factors included:
quality of research, quality of teaching, quality and quantity of clinical work,
number and significance of publication, reputation, generation of private practice,
development of an important clinical process, procurement or administration of a
major grant, any offer of employment from a competing college, mobility, signifi-
cance of any contributions to science, and, more generally, the manner in which a
faculty member spent his or her time.
Id. at 1179.
154. 422 F. Supp. 593, 614 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir.
1987). See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text for a full discussion of Presseisen.
155. Sobel, 566 F. Supp. at 1180.
156. Id. The court believed that the importance of these factors in determining a
faculty member's level of compensation warranted their inclusion in the multiple regres-
sion analysis, regardless of the problems in measuring such factors. Id.
157. Id. at 1186. The court denied the pattern and practice claim because the plain-
tiffs failed to provide a complete statistical model, neglected to consider the effect of pre-
Title VII discrimination, and failed to show individual instances of discrimination. Id.
at 1182-86.
158. Id at 1186.
159. Id. at 1186-87. The court found the sudden switch to disparate impact imper-
missible after seven years of preparation solely directed toward the disparate treatment
theory. Id.
160. Id. at 1188. See supra notes 150, 151 and accompanying text (explaining the
mechanics of the guideline system).
161. 740 F.2d at 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
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tion of Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and section 1983.162 To justify
the disparity, the defendant University claimed that it based salaries on
the training, expertise, emphasis, subject matter, and market demand
for each discipline. 16 3 Thus, interschool comparisons were inappropri-
ate." This argument persuaded the Ninth Circuit, which ruled that
plaintiffs' Equal Pay Act claim failed for lack of job equivalence. 161
Similarly, the court held that the plaintiffs' disparate impact claim
failed because the University's consideration of market demand did not
constitute a facially neutral policy under the meaning of disparate
impact. 166
C. Proposals
1. Subjective Factors
Courts are split as to whether regression analysis should include sub-
jective factors. Courts recognize the importance of these factors in aca-
demic decisions, but are hesitant to include variables that lack
objectivity or measurability.' 67 While the lack of measurability is
problematic,168 it does not warrant the exclusion of variables so crucial
to academic salary decisions.1 69 For example, in Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust the Supreme Court recognized that subjective evalua-
tions are essential to many employment decisions170 and should receive
162. 740 F.2d at 691.
163. Id. at 692.
164. Id. at 697. The University contended that courts should never compare jobs
from varying disciplines due to their substantial inequality. The court disagreed with
this broad contention. Id.
165. Id. at 699. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim for lack of
jurisdiction, since the state decided not to waive sovereign immunity. Id. at 694.
166. Id. at 708.
167. See supra note 64 (parties in Presseisen conceded such factors' lack of measura-
bility). But see supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text (while noting lack of measur-
ability, Supreme Court in Watson still deemed such inclusion workable).
168. The author refrains from proposing any exact statistical method by which a
plaintiff or defendant might measure such factors. It seems clear, however, that once
such a system is devised, statistical experts may easily identify the effect of subjective
factors by holding constant all other variables. See generally Finkelstein, The Judicial
Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 737 (1980); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980).
169. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (Sobel court discussion of the im-
portance of subjective factors).
170. See supra notes 117-39 and accompanying text (discussing Watson); see also
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greater judicial tolerance as the job's complexity increases.17 1  The
complexity of academic positions warrants a higher tolerance of subjec-
tive criteria. 17' But this judicial tolerance should not result in sanc-
tioning the discriminatory use of subjective factors. Past courts have
required inclusion of all consequential factors in academic regression
analysis. Given the importance of subjective criteria in academic sal-
ary decisions, there is no reason why subjective variables should not
follow the history of 'rank' in becoming a mandatory part of any aca-
demic regression analysis.
173
2. Disparate Impact Theory
To date, no plaintiff has successfully used disparate impact to chal-
lenge an academic salary decision or system. In fact, female plaintiffs
generally have fared poorly in suits against their college or university
employers.174 Much of this failure is due to the lack of direct evidence
of discrimination, which is often difficult to prove in academic set-
tings.175 In light of such burdens on the plaintiff, courts must decide
whether to expand disparate impact into territory solely inhabited by
disparate treatment. 176
Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975) (subjective criteria are
not per se unlawful).
171. Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857, 867-69 (D. Vt. 1976).
172. See Lewis v. Chicago State College, 299 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
The Lewis court stated: "A professor's value depends upon his creativity, his rapport
with students and colleagues, his teaching ability, and numerous other intangible quali-
ties which cannot be measured by objective standards." Ird.
173. Judicial receptivity to the inclusion of subjective factors is illustrated in Penk v.
Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 816 F.2d 458, 465 (9th Cir. 1987), where the Ninth
Circuit noted that the district court expressly discounted plaintiffs' statistical analysis
for failure to include crucial decision-making variables such as teaching quality, com-
munity and institutional service, quality of research, and scholarship. Id
174. Female faculty plaintiffs have lost in the following cases: Keyes v. Lenoir
Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977); Faro v. New
York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974); Green v. Board of Regents of Texas Tech
Univ., 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973) (suit under § 1983); Peters v. Middlebury College,
409 F. Supp. 857 (D. Vt. 1976); Van deVate v. Boling, 379 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Tenn.
1974).
175. In Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 596 F.2d 169, 175 (1st
Cir. 1978), the court stated, "Particularly in a college or university setting, where the
level of sophistication is likely to be much higher than in other employment situations,
direct evidence of sex discrimination will rarely be available." Id.
176. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 808 n.17 (5th Cir. 1986)
(debate as to applicability of disparate impact is not insignificant since disparate impact
has lesser burdens than disparate treatment).
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Courts should allow plaintiffs to use the disparate impact theory in
cases of academic salary discrimination for four reasons. First, because
academic decision making is often clandestine, courts should eliminate
the plaintiffs' onerous proof-of-intent requirement. 1 77 This would elim-
inate the plaintiff's difficult task of searching for direct evidence of dis-
crimination. Second, the intent requirement is a needless formality
where there is a marked salary disparity between male and female
faculty. 178 In such cases the discriminatory results of the university's
actions are manifest, making proof of intent unnecessary. 17 9 Third,
although plaintiffs may contest subjective decisions under the disparate
treatment theory, one might also consider a subjective system facially
neutral, as all professors are subject to the same evaluations, publica-
tion guidelines, and service requirements."' Thus, if the school ap-
plied the same criteria equally to all faculty members and an adverse
impact on women resulted, then disparate impact analysis should
apply. 181
Finally, courts should apply the Supreme Court's ruling in Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust 18 2 to institutions of higher education for two
reasons. First, much like in Watson, the use of subjective factors in
academic salary determinations may mirror the discriminatory effects
produced by the use of objective factors. 8 3 Second, the same four legal
safeguards discussed in Watson-practice identification, proof of cau-
177. The Penk court demonstrated the possible size of a plaintiff class' burden in
academic salary discrimination cases: "The heavy burden accepted by the plaintiffs in
this action was ultimately to prove intentional discrimination across the whole state
system of higher education." Penk, 816 F.2d at 465. See also Note, Sex-Based Wage
Discrimination Under the Title VII Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN L. REV. 1083,
1089-92 (1982) (arguing for the application of disparate impact to sex-based wage
discrimination).
178. See supra note 4 (table showing disparities in male and female faculty salaries
at the University of Missouri).
179. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (focus of disparate impact should be
on consequences of the action rather than the motivation). Some university defendants
have argued that such a theory amounts to an imposition of strict liability on academic
institutions. See Note, Disparate Impact and Subjective Employment Criteria Under Ti-
tle VII, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 977-78 (1987) (arguing that an academic employer may
still successfully defend against such charges).
180. See supra notes 63, 89-90, 153 and accompanying text (subjective factors used
in previously discussed cases).
181. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text on general disparate impact
theory.
182. See supra notes 117-39 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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sation, ultimate plaintiff burden, and judicial deference to employment
practices 184 -would prevent a faculty evaluation system from becom-
ing tainted by quotas and preferential treatment. Thus, given the simi-
larity of results in objective and subjective factor cases and the existing
legal safeguards, courts deciding sex-based, academic salary discrimi-
nation cases should follow the Supreme Court's lead in Watson and
allow plaintiffs to use disparate impact analysis. Such a result is only a
logical extension of this landmark decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The heightened concern over the inequitable disparity between male
and female faculty salaries is readily apparent today. In light of female
faculty members' understandable frustration with the judicial system in
remedying this problem, courts should ease the burden of proving sal-
ary discrimination in higher education. Because subjective factors are
crucial to the academic setting and are a source of salary disparities,
courts should require inclusion of subjective factors in multiple regres-
sion analysis. This inclusion would decrease a university's ability to
make arbitrary or unjustified salary decisions. 8 Additionally, future
courts, following the lead of Watson, should allow the use of disparate
impact in the academic setting. This would provide female faculty
members with an enhanced opportunity to close the salary gap should
a college or university fail voluntarily to remedy the problem.186
Keith W. Bartz*
184. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
185. The kind of result which courts must try to avoid is best expressed by named
plaintiff Professor Helen Mecklenburg. When asked whether she would do anything
differently after her case, she replied, "I would not be an academic. Although I love
this way of life, you have to cope with arbitrary, capricious decisions. . . ." G. LANOUE
& B. LEE, ACADEMICS IN THE COURT: THE CONSEQUENCES OF FACULTY DISCRIMI-
NATION 172 (1987).
186. While beyond the scope of this Note, Washington University Professor Karen
Tokarz is currently studying the issue of remedies after a finding of salary discrimina-
tion in a university setting. The author wishes to thank Professor Tokarz for her help in
developing the initial focus of this Note.
* J.D. 1989, Washington University.
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